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THE EMPLOYE DEFENSE ACT: WEARING DOWN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
INTRODUCTION
For many years, the judiciary and legislature of Kentucky
have contemplated the complete abrogation of sovereign im-
munity.' The doctrine that the state is immune from civil suit
was first acknowledged by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in
1828.2 Since that time the doctrine has retained vitality in
Kentucky even though the federal government and many other
states4 have relinquished such immunity. The Kentucky Court
has repeatedly refused to abrogate the doctrine; the Court's
theory is that sovereign immunity is constitutionally based 5
and that only the General Assembly6 may abolish immunity
I See generally Oberst & Lewis, Claims Against the State of Kentucky, 42 KY. L.J.
65 (1953).
2 In Divine v. Harvie, 23 Ky. (7 T.B. Mon.) 439, 441 (1828), the Court stated that
"[i]t seems to be conceded on all hands that the State can not be made a party
defendant, and is not suable in her own courts." However, "[tihe Kentucky Court of
Appeals has seldom bothered to consider the soundness of the doctrine, or even to cite
precedent for it." Oberst, The Board of Claims Act of 1950, 39 Ky. L.J. 35 (1950). The
Court has accepted it as "an elementary principle of the law. . . that the state cannot
be sued without its consent. . . ." Zoeller v. State Bd. of Agriculture, 173 S.W. 1143,
1144 (Ky. 1915), quoted in Oberst, supra at 35.
Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970).
See, e.g., Stone v. State Highway Comm., 381 P.2d 107. (Ariz. 1963); Muskopf
v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961); Evans v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 482 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1971); Smith v. State, 473 P.2d 937 (Idaho 1970); Camp-
bell v. State, 284 N.E.2d 733 (Ind. 1972); Bd. of Comm'rs v. Splendour Shipping &
Enterprises Co., 273 So. 2d 19 (La. 1973); Nieting v. Blondell, 235 N.W.2d 597 (Minn.
1975); Willis v. Dept. of Conservation, 264 A.2d 34 (N.J. 1970); Hicks v. State, 544
P.2d 1153 (N.M. 1975).
' See, e.g., Foley Constr. Co. v. Ward, 375 S.W.2d 392, 393 (Ky. 1963), in which
the Court stated:
The right of sovereign immunity in Kentucky has existed from the be-
ginning of the Commonwealth. Article VIII, Section 4, 1792 Kentucky Con-
stitution provides: "The legislature shall direct by law in what manner and
what courts suits may be brought against the Commonwealth." With minor
variations this principle has been embodied in each of the succeeding Consti-
tutions. Article VI, Section 6, 1799 Kentucky Constitution; Article VIII,
Section 6, 1850 Kentucky Constitution; Section 231, 1891 Kentucky Consti-
tution.
See, e.g., Cullinan v. Jefferson County, 418 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Ky. 1967):
[T]his court should not invade the constitutional authority of the General
Assembly by holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar a
tort action . . . . [T]he members of the legislative branch . . . are elected
• . . to reflect the feeling of the people and to enact laws to meet their needs.
COMMENTS
under Section 231 of the Kentucky Constitution.7
Strenuous arguments have been made, however, that sov-
ereign immunity is not mandated by the constitution8 and
that, in fact, the doctrine is unconstitutional under both the
Kentucky' and United States constitutions.10 Opponents of this
immunity also argue that the doctrine stems solely from judi-
cial holdings and can be judicially abrogated."
When the people . . . want sovereign immunity waived . . ., their elected
legislative representatives will be charged with this responsibility.
It is doubtful that the average citizen of Kentucky is even aware that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity exists until the state injures him, so it is unlikely that the citizens
will seek legislative action. Whether the Court has overemphasized the language of §
231 with the intent of limiting the state's responsibility or whether "the Kentucky
Constitution has from the beginning provided an escape valve for claims against the
irresponsible state by making provision for legislation," Oberst, supra note 2, at 36,
there is no relief from "the harshness of the effects on unfortunate persons so often
wrought by the doctrine. . . ." 418 S.W.2d at 410 (Milliken, J., concurring).
I'"The General Assembly may, by law, direct in what manner and in what courts
suits may be brought against the Commonwealth." Ky. CONST. § 231. Furthermore,
"Kentucky Constitution Section 230 (which provides for restrictions on withdrawal of
money from the State Treasury) complements Section 231." Foley Constr. Co. v.
Ward, 375 S.W.2d 392, 393 (Ky. 1963).
1 A close reading of [§ 231] clearly shows that the Section does not say
that suit may not be brought against the Commonwealth without the Gen-
eral Assembly's approval. The Section merely states that the General As-
sembly may determine the procedure for bringing a suit against the Com-
monwealth and that the General Assembly may determine in what court suit
must be brought. It does not state that the Commonwealth can not be sued
or that the General Assembly can determine if and when suit may be
brought.
Brief for Appellant at 4, Huffman v. Commonwealth, No. CA-690-MR (Ky. Ct. App.
1977).
1 Id. Counsel argued that Ky. CONST. § § 2, 4, 7, and 14 (Bill of Rights) in conjunc-
tion with § 54 (which provides that the legislature has no power to limit the amount
of recovery for injuries leading to death or to personal or property injury) are meant to
protect individual rights, not the rights of the state. To deny suit against the state
"would be to deny claimants most of the rights granted to them by the Bill of Rights
of the Kentucky Constitution." Id. at 5.
Id. at 7-18.
" Id. at 4. It is also of some interest to note that in abrogating both charitable
and municipal immunity, the Court recognized that those immunities were judicial in
creation and thus could be judicially abrogated. In Mulliken v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n,
348 S.W.2d 930, 932 (Ky. 1961), the Court acknowledged that although in Forrest v.
Red Cross Hosp., 265 S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1954) it had held that it was for the legislature
to abolish charitable immunity, "[wihen there is negligence the rule is liability." The
Court thus judicially abrogated the immunity.
In Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Ky. 1964), the Court recog-
nized that the "very machinery of the short biennial sessions of the General Assembly
denies to it the time. . . to examine the various doctrines. . . of common law torts,"
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Perhaps in the wake of such criticism, both the Court and
the legislature have diminished the scope of the doctrine. Not
only have Kentucky charities1 2 and municipalities 3 lost im-
munity from suit but judicial interpretation of Section 13 of the
Kentucky Constitution has resulted in a waiver of governmen-
tal immunity in eminent domain cases. 4 The legislature also
has provided for suit against public school districts once the
district has purchased insurance;" statutes of a similar nature
control suits against counties. 6 In breach of contract actions,
the state has lost its defense of immunity by statute.
1 7
In 1946, the Kentucky legislature created the Board of
Claims,'8 which was analyzed as the potential end to immunity
from liability for tortious conduct by the state. 9 The language
and took it upon itself "to correct an unjust rule which was judicially created."
The contention that the doctrine is not constitutionally based but rather judically
created, and thus subject to judicial abrogation, is strongly supported by reading the
language above with that in State Park Comm. v. Wilder, 84 S.W.2d 38, 39 (Ky. 1935):
"This immunity has come down to us as part of the fundamental common law and is
only indirectly contained in the Constitution."
2 Mulliken v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n. 348 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. 1961).
" Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738, 739 (Ky. 1964). The Court, in
ending municipal immunity, noted that "[t]here is probably no tenet in our law that
has been more universally berated by courts and legal writers than the governmental
immunity doctrine," citing 41 N.C.L. REv. 290, 291 (1963), yet the Court reiterated
that sovereign immunity still stands. See also Comment, Torts-Sovereign Immun-
ity-Municipal Liability, 57 Ky. L.J. 763 (1969).
'1 Ky. CONST. § 13, construed in State Park Comm. v. Wilder, 84 S.W.2d 38 (Ky.
1935), provides: "[N]or shall any man's property be taken or applied to public use
without the consent of his representatives, and without just compensation being pre-
viously made to him." See also Oberst, Claims Against the State of Ken-
tucky-Reverse Eminent Domain, 42 Ky. L.J. 163 (1954).
11 Ky. REv. STAT. § 160.310 (1970) [hereinafter cited as KRS], construed in Tay-
lor v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 167 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. 1942) (once a board has pur-
chased insurance, which is permissive under the statute, it cannot raise the defense of
immunity).
Is KRS §§ 67.180, .185, .186 (1970) (liability limited to the extent of the policy
amount).
11 "All defenses in law or equity, except the defense of governmental immunity,
shall be preserved to the commonwealth." KRS § 44.270 (Supp. 1976).
I KRS §§ 176.290-.380 (1948) provided compensation for injuries sustained due
to negligence in construction, reconstruction, maintenance, and policing of highways,
with jurisdiction of the Board limited to $1000 in controversy. See generally Richard-
son, Kentucky Board of Claims, 35 Ky. L.J. 295 (1947).
11 "It is believed not unlikely that this Act will prove its worth to the point that
some future session of the General Assembly will widen its scope to include all
branches of the state government." Richardson, supra note 18, at 301.
COMMENTS
in the statute was broadened in 195020 from liability for negli-
gence in highway claims to claims arising out of "negligence on
the part of the commonwealth, any of its departments . . . or
any of its. . agents. while acting within the scope of their
employment . *... ,,2 Unfortunately, however, several limita-
tions have diluted this broad language. For example, the cur-
rent statute places a $20,000 ceiling on damage awards22 and
forbids any compensation for pain and suffering.23 Judicial con-
struction has further limited the statute's scope as to which
departments are within its coverage. 24 In light of this narrow
applicability, early optimism about the effect of the statute has
dissolved-the Board of Claims 25 has not provided a viable
means of circumventing sovereign immunity.
2
The Court has not taken any further affirmative action
towards abrogation. However, in the 1976 session, the General
Assembly was presented with another opportunity to abrogate
sovereign immunity entirely. 2 Instead, it passed the Employe
Defense Act,2s the effect and implications of which are still
unclear.
I. THE EMPLOYE DEFENSE AcT
In the 1976 session of the General Assembly, an act29 pro-
2, KRS §§ 44.070-.160 (1950)(current version at KRS §§ 44.070-.160 (Supp. 1976).
21 KRS § 44.070 (1)(1950) (amendment provided for a $5000 limitation on claims).
2 KRS § 44.070 (5) (Supp. 1976).
KRS § 44.070 (1).
24 See, e.g., Gnau v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 346 S.W.2d
754, 755 (Ky. 1961), in which the Court held that while a sewer district is an agency
of the state, since it is not "under the direction and control of the central State
government," it is not within the statute. Of course, since the district is an agency of
the state, it is protected from suit by sovereign immunity.
23 KRS §§ 44.070-.160 (1970).
" The legislature had also provided for special laws to be enacted in order to
compensate individuals injured by state employees. These were recognized as "a costly
procedure, taking up much valuable time of legislators who have a very limited time
to give to other and more weighty matters." Richardson, supra note 18, at 299. Subse-
quent to the creation of the Board of Claims, the Court, in a 4-3 decision, held that
since the establishment of the Board of Claims was a general law, § 59 of the Kentucky
Constitution prohibits further special legislation. Private resolutions, therefore, were
held unconstitutional. Commonwealth v. McCoun, 313 S.W.2d 585 (Ky. 1958).
7 S. 304, 1976 Regular Session, SEATE JOURNAL 867-68 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as S. 304].
21 KRS §§ 12.211-.215 (Supp. 1976).
29 S. 304, supra note 27.
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viding for the express termination of the defense of sovereign
immunity" was proposed and received favorably.' Recognizing
"that in the interest of equity and justice, an individual dam-
aged due to the negligence of an employe . . .of Kentucky
... .should not be expected or required to bear the resultant
financial loss without just compensation,"32 Senate Bill 304
provided that all departments and agencies of the state would
be exposed to liability.3 3 At the legislature's discretion, the
state would then have either purchased liability insurance3 or
become a self-insurer.3 5 Section 2 of the bill, broadly inter-
preted, would have allowed compensation for pain and suffer-
ing,36 now excluded by the Board of Claims provisions. 7 In fact,
3 S. 304, supra note 27, at § 2 provided that the defense of sovereign immunity
be "abolished," yet retained all other defenses for the state. In effect, this would have
made the state liable for negligent conduct just as any other individual or corporation
would have been.
3, The Act was sponsored by 22 of the 38 senators. 1976 Regular Session, SENATE
JOURNAL 436 (1976). The Committee on Judiciary-Statutes reported the Act for general
consideration and recommended passage. Id. at 865.
3, S. 304, supra note 27, at § 1.
' Id. The language allowed suit against "the commonwealth of Kentucky, its
political subdivisions, departments or agencies." This was broader than the Board of
Claims provision since it included political subdivisions. However, though the Act
would have repealed various provisions relating to the Board of Claims, it was silent
as to KRS §§ 67.180 and 67.185 (1970), which limit county liability to the policy
amount of any insurance purchased by the county. Nor did it confront KRS § 160.310
(1970), which likewise limits liability for school bus accidents to the policy amount.
See Taylor v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 167 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. 1942).
11 S. 304, supra note 27, did not specify any guidelines as to the purchase of
insurance or its effect. The Kentucky Court of Appeals had already construed purchase
of insurance under KRS § 160.310 as a waiver of immunity up to the limits of the
policy. Taylor v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 167 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. 1942). Under S. 304,
would the state then be able to limit its liability by the amount of insurance it
purchases? Recalling that the Act expressly held the state liable as any private individ-
ual would be, it would seem that the intent of the Act would not be to allow such
limitation.
21 Interview with Sandra M. Varellas, amicus curiae, Sheckles v. McClure, Civ.
No. 87383 (Franklin Cir. Ct. 1976); co-counsel, Huffman v. Commonwealth, No. CA-
690-MR (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); author, S. 304, supra note 27, in Lexington, Kentucky
(March 4, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Interview with Varellas]. Ms. Varellas indicated
that it would probably be less expensive for the state to be a self-insurer due to the
surplusages in the state treasury and the saved expense of the state processing its own
claims.
"' The state would "be liable for money damages for injury or loss of property or
personal injury or death" under S. 304, supra note 27, at § 2. The Act also exposed
the state to the same liability as that of a private individual. Thus, it could be argued
that under S. 304 the state, like a private individual, would be liable for pain and
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Senate Bill 304 also provided for abolition of the Board of
Claims38 and imposed liability for negligence on the State of
Kentucky equal to the liability of private citizens. 9 Senate Bill
304, however, is not the law. It met with sudden defeat and in
its place emerged the Employe Defense Act.4"
Under the Employe Defense Act (the Act) the Attorney
General, at his discretion,41 may provide a defense for any em-
ployee subject to suit in actions arising as a result of any "act
or omission made in the scope and course of his employment
as an employe of the commonwealth and any of its agencies.
4 2
The Act's language is not as broad as Senate Bill 304. First, it
clearly retains sovereign immunity, 3 whereas the express in-
tent of Senate Bill 304 was to abolish it.4 Second, the Employe
Defense Act limits liability to $50,000,15 whereas Senate Bill
304 had no such ceiling. Third, the Act does not automatically
suffering. See also note 39 infra for another argument as to why liability for pain and
suffering is included under the Act.
11 KRS § 44.070 (1) (Supp. 1976).
34 S. 304, supra note 27, at § 6.
31 Id. § 2. The language is similar to that in the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1970), which provides that the United States government shall be
liable like a private person. That liability has been interpreted to encompass pain and
suffering. See, e.g., Steeves v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 446 (D.S.C. 1968) and
Newman v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1965). The liability has also been
held to be based on state tort law. E.g., Hoyt v. United States, 286 F.2d 356 (5th Cir.
1961).
10 KRS §§ 12.211-.215. (Supp. 1976). There is very little legislative history avail-
able that would indicate why one act passed instead of the other. S. 304, supra note
27, was introduced on Feb. 25, 1976 to the Senate and was reported favorably out of
committee with amendments on March 10, 1976. On March 15, 1976, however, it was
recommitted to committee where it died. 12 Ky. LEG. REC. 51, 86 (1976).
KRS §§ 12.211-.215 was introduced in the House, went through committees, and
was passed by a vote of 78 to 1. It was received in the Senate on March 16, 1976 and
passed 38 to 0 on March 18, 1976. 12 Ky. LEG. REc. 51, 86 (1976).
No other material is available on either bill.
11 KRS § 12.211 (Supp. 1976) states that the attorney general "may provide" a
legal defense for an employee. KRS § 12.212 gives the Attorney General the right to
refuse to defend an employee, based on determinations delineated in the statute.
Subsection 2 allows the Attorney General to delegate that power of determination to
the employee's agency or department.
11 KRS § 12.211 (Supp. 1976).
13 KRS § 12.214 (Supp. 1976).
1 See notes 27-39 supra and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of S. 304,
supra note 27.
15 KRS § 12.214 (1) (Supp. 1976) states: "Judgements up to $50,000 will be paid
out of the unappropriated general fund."
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expose the state to litigation," whereas Senate Bill 304 treated
the state as a private individual47 who, as a defendant, must
defend or lose by default. In fact, because the language of the
Act -is so vague, it could be construed to allow the state to
escape all liability.48 Due to the indefiniteness of the language
and the lack of discernible legislative intent,49 questions as to
its construction, scope, and applicability are left unanswered.
II. THE ACT AND ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
The Act authorizes the Governor to "provide by regulation
. . . for the [methods of] defense of employes"5 through (1)
the attorney general, (2) other employed counsel, (3) insurance
which would cover the cost of defense, or (4) counsel from the
employee's department. In response to this provision, the Gov-
ernor has issued administrative regulations which comprehen-
sively regulate methods of defense. 51 Because these Regulations
have been approved by the Administrative Regulation Review
Subcommittee, 5 the Attorney General has argued as an inter-
vening defendant in Sheckles v. McClure53 that these regula-
tions represent the legislative intent behind the Act.
Whether or not the Regulations54 are indicative of legisla-
tive intent, their effect is to narrow seriously the scope of the
Act. For example, the Act provides that the Attorney General
may defend a suit arising from actions by an employee "in the
"' Though no decisions involving the application of the Act have been rendered,
Sheckles v. McCture is now before the Franklin Circuit Court. It has been argued
before that court that the Act should be limited to provide defenses only for executives
of the central government and not for school and municipal employees. Memorandum
for Intervening Defendant Attorney General, Sheckles v. McClure, Civ. No. 87383
(Franklin Cir. Ct. 1976)[hereinafter cited as Memo for Intervening Defendant].
' S. 304, supra note 27, at § 2.
' Memo for Intervening Defendant, supra note 46. The Attorney General argued
that the Act applies to any suit solely at the Attorney General's discretion and that
an "act or omission" within the Act applies only to "governmental decision making,"
id. at 3, and not to ordinary negligence, id. at 5. He also argued that the meaning of
"state employee" should be narrowly construed to include only central government
employees.
"' See note 40 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of legislative actions
on the Employe Defense Act.
KRS § 12.213 (Supp. 1976).
, 10 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 1:010 (1976) [hereinafter cited as KARl.
52 Id.
Civ. No. 87383 (Franklin Cir. Ct. 1976).
" KAR, supra note 51.
[Vol. 66
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scope and course of his employment as an employe of the com-
monwealth and any of its agencies." 55 Elsewhere in the Act, the
language refers to the delegation of defense to counsel
"assigned to or employed by the department, agency, board,
commission, bureau or authority which employed the person
requesting the defense." 5 In the Regulations, "state agency" is
defined as excluding "local units of state government such as
school districts, counties, sewer districts or other municipali-
ties. '57 The Attorney General has argued that this definition
reflects a legislative intent to limit the applicability of the
statute solely to executives in the central government."
This argument gains further support in the Regulations."
There the class of defendants is limited to those "sued in a civil
action over acts or omissions of a discretionary nature."60 How-
KRS § 12.211 (Supp. 1976).
" KRS § 12.213.
'7 KAR, supra note 51, at § 1(4).
5' Memo for Intervening Defendant, supra note 46. Section 1 (4) of KAR, supra
note 51, does define state agency to include any "department, administrative body,
division or program cabinet" excluding local governmental units.
In Sheckles, plaintiff suffered a broken neck and resulting total paralysis while
participating in a tumbling class at a Louisville junior high school where he was a
student. He had engaged in the exercise at the direction of a teacher employed by the
Louisville Board of Education. In a suit against the Board, the Jefferson Circuit Court
granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground that the Board, as an agency
of the state, was protected by sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Upon passage of the Employe Defense Act, plaintiff Sheckles brought suit again
in Jefferson Circuit Court. The court found that the defendant-teacher was a state
employee and was acting within the scope of his employment. Sheckles, pursuant to
the Act, demanded payment from the Secretary for Finance and Administration.
When the Secretary refused, the action was commenced in Franklin Circuit Court.
The Attorney General maintains that as a school board employee, the teacher was
not within the scope of the Act. He further argues that "the purpose of the Act was to
assist the Governor in enlisting competent.executives for his administration and to
provide a means by which an executive sued for some discretionary act may have a
legal defense without expending his personal fortune." Memo for Intervening Defen-
dant, supra note 46, at 4-5.
The difficulty with the Attorney General's interpretation is that it has become
generally accepted that an officer of a state is not liable for torts due to discretionary
acts. See K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 485-87 (3d ed. 1972). An executive in
such a suit would only have to nove for a summary judgment and would thus have no
need of the Act's provision for payment of judgments.
" KAR, supra note 51, at § 1(3).
Id. (emphasis added). The Attorney General argued that the defendant teacher
had been negligent and that "[n]o governmental decision making was involved. The
tort, therefore, was not an 'act of omission' under the purview of the Act." Memo for
1977]
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ever, the Act itself speaks only of an act or omission made in
the scope or course of employment." While the Act does specifi-
cally exclude "discretionary acts or decisions pertaining to the
design or construction of public highways, bridges, or build-
ings," 62 there seems to be no explicit language in the Act that
could be construed to exclude any other type of ordinary negli-
gence. 3 Furthermore, state employees involved in traffic acci-
dents in a state vehicle are apparently not excluded as defen-
dants by the Act even though the Regulations expressly remove
such individuals from the class of defendants for whom the
state will compensate the victims.64
Opponents of the Attorney General's interpretation that
the Regulations indicate legislative intent argue that if the
definitions provided in the Regulations are meant to apply to
the Act,15 there has been an unconstitutional delegation of leg-
islative power." Legislative power is vested only in the General
Assembly as mandated by the Kentucky Constitution. Provi-
sions that require the separation of legislative, executive, and
judicial functions into three departments 8 do not allow one
department to exercise the power of another." However, the
Intervening Defendant, supra note 46, at 3. Ordinary negligence would not be within
the Act's scope.
," KRS § 12.211 (Supp. 1976).
62 Id.
63 The argument is that negligence should be excluded because "[t]he term 'act
or omission' is a term of art which implies a voluntary, witting, act, as contrasted with
carelessness and negligence." Memo for Intervening Defendant, supra note 46, at 4.
1 KAR, supra note 51, at § 5(4) states: "KRS 44.055 authorizes state agencies to
purchase policies of insurance covering vehicles owned by the state. For this reason
'defendant', as defined in Section 1(3), does not include a person being sued for negli-
gence in the operation of a state vehicle."
"5 Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, Sheckles v. McClure, Civ. No. 87383 (Franklin
Cir. Ct. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Memo of Amicus Curiae]. Attorney for amicus
curiae, Sandra M. Varellas, argued that the definitions in the Regulations could not
be intended to apply to the Act but would apply only to the Regulations themselves.
The Regulations state: "Section 1. Definitions. When used in this regulation . .. .
Ms. Varellas argued that "the Governor was given no power by the General Assembly
to adopt definitions to be used in interpreting the statute." Memo of Amicus Curiae,
supra, at 16.
11 "The General Assembly did not attempt to give to the Governor the power to
establish the coverage of the Act since the General Assembly is certainly aware that
any such attempt would be an unconstitutional delegation of its legislative power."
Memo of Amicus Curiae, supra note 65, at 16.
Ky. CONST. § 29.
M Id. § 27.
6Id. § 28.
COMMENTS
Court has recognized that "the legislature cannot deal with
subordinate rules or cover the details of administration and
execution in its regulatory enactments."70 Some flexibility in
applying the constitutional requirements has been allowed to
insure proper governmental functioning.
Even though "[t]he principle that the Constitution does
not prohibit some delegation of legislative power is well set-
tled,"" there still remains a fine line between constitutional
and unconstitutional delegation. "The legislature must declare
the policy of the law and fix the principles which are to control
in given cases; but an administrative officer or body may be
invested with the power to ascertain the facts and conditions
to which the policy and principles apply. 7 2 The narrower class
of defendants in the Regulations73 -may have developed as an
attempt to meet legislative intent, but it can be argued that
"[i]f the Legislature intend[ed] to confer upon administra-
tive bodies" the authority to specify to whom the Act applies,
"that intent should [have been] expressed in clear and unmis-
takeable terms." 4 The Act expresses only an intent that the
Governor "shall provide by regulation . . . for the defense of
employes"7 5 by the methods enumerated by the legislature.
III. THE FUTURE OF THE EMPLOYE DEFENSE ACT
Until the courts have reached judgment on the application
Bloemer v. Turner, 137 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Ky. 1939).
" Hopkins v. Ford, 534 S.W.2d 792, 795 (Ky. 1976). While it is clear that some
delegation is constitutionally acceptable, the Court indicated that "[ilt is all a matter
of degree to be determined in the light of specificacts and circumstances." Id. Deter-
mining to what degree is no easy task. However, in Parks Co. v. Allphin, 295 S.W.2d
562, 565 (Ky. 1956), the Court indicated that although it would not determine if the
Department of Revenue had the power to make regulations applicableto state tax law,
the Court was "of [the] opinion that the Department had no power to add to or
subtract from the standard set up by the statute itself."
If that rationale is applied to the Regulations here, the issue then becomes whether
the Governor's Regulations subtract from the class of potential defendants under the
Act so as to exceed constitutional authority.
11 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 166 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Ky. 1942). The General As-
sembly can delegate only that fact-finding power necessary for efficient administration
of the law. The constitution prohibits legislative delegation of the power to determine
or create laws. Henry v. Parrish, 211 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Ky. 1948).
" See text accompanying notes 55-64 supra for a discussion of the narrower class
of defendants contemplated by the Regulations.
" Henry v. Parrish, 211 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Ky. 1948).
' KRS § 12.213 (Supp. 1976).
1977]
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of the Employe Defense Act,76 many questions remain unan-
swered. Two issues which will have to be considered are how
the Act will operate, in conjunction with the Board of Claims,
and whether the Act itself is constitutional.
A. The Act and the Board of Claims
In determining how the Employe Defense Act will operate
in the presence of the Board of Claims,77 much will depend
upon whether the courts decide that the definitions in the Reg-
ulations will control the class of defendants covered by the Act.
The Board of Claims provisions have been interpreted to apply
solely to "agencies which are under the direction and control
of the central state government and are supported by monies
which 'are disbursed by authority of the Commissioner of Fi-
nance out of the State treasury."78 This excludes agents of
sewer districts7 and school districts." Even though neither are
within the Board of Claims, both have been deemed arms of
the state so that they are protected from civil suit by sovereign
immunity.8 ' Should the definitions in the Regulations prevail
as controlling the scope of the Act, sewer districts, boards of
education, and other local governmental arms of the state
would continue to escape liability for tortious conduct.82
On the other hand, should the courts decide that the Regu-
lation's definitions do not apply to the Act itself, then it would
be more advantageous for a plaintiff to bring an action under
the Act than before the Board of Claims. 3 The Act would pre-
sumably include governmental agencies not necessarily a part
7' The Franklin Circuit Court should have the opportunity to decide this issue
within the next few months. See text accompanying notes 50-75 supra for a discussion
of the Attorney General's argument in Sheckles v. McClure, Civ. No. 87383 (Franklin
Cir. Ct. 1976).
7 KRS § 44.070 (Supp. 1976).
7' Gnau v. Louisville & Jefferson County, 346 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Ky. 1961).
, See Cullinan v. Jefferson County, 418 S.W.2d 407 (1967).
' See Wood v. Board of Educ., 412 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1967).
' See note 24 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of limitations on the
Board of Claims Act.
62 See KAR, supra note 51, at § 1(4).
' It seems unlikely that one could bring an action both before the Board of Claims
and under the Act. The Act allows suit against the individual employee, with defense
and payment afforded by the state. An action against the state before the Board of




of the central government. 4 Victims of negligent conduct by
any state agent" could then bring actions in courts of compe-
tent jurisdiction. Further, "all final judgments awarded . . .
not exceeding fifty thousand dollars. . . [would] be paid.. -.
from the unappropriated general fund surplus in the state
treasury." 6 Recovery for pain and suffering, denied by the
Board of Claims Statutes,87 would be allowed.
Furthermore, the Employe Defense Act would afford pro-
cedural advantages to the plaintiff. For example, the claimant
who appeals from the Board of Claims is granted only "a lim-
ited appellate review" '88 stemming from the statutory restric-
tions.89 Under the Act, however, the plaintiff would have gen-
eral appellate review governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure"
and application of the general rules of evidence. The Board, on
the other hand, has not been guided "by the well recognized
rules of evidence." 9' Finally, no longer would an injured party
be bringing an action against a negligent party who is both
defendant and judge.
B. The Issue of Constitutionality
In Sheckles v. McClure2 the Attorney General argued that
the statute requiring judgments of up to $50,000 be paid out of
the unappropriated general fund93 was unconstitutional under
' KRS § 12.211 (Supp. 1976).
Of course, the plaintiff would still have to show that the employee fits within
the Act, i.e., that the employee was acting within the scope of employment. The
Attorney General has argued that if he decides not to defend an employee under KRS
§ 12.212, then the employee is not within any provisions of the Act. Memo for Interven-
ing Defendant, supra note 46. In response to this argument, it has been submitted that
if the Attorney General was correct, it "would amount to giving the Attorney General
total fact-finding authority with respect to this Act. . . .This would allow the Act to
be applied or not applied to a state employee at the mere whim of the Attorney
General." Memo of Amicus Curiae, supra note 65, at 12.
" KRS § 12.214 (Supp. 1976).
KRS § 44.070(1) (1970).
" Commonwealth v. Bergee Bros., Inc., 480 S.W.2d 158, 159 (Ky. 1972).
" KRS § 44.140 (1970).
" Cf. Commonwealth v. Chinn, 350 S.W.2d 622 (Ky. 1961)(in which the Court
held that before the Board of Claims, the state does not have to plead affirmatively
the statute of limitations; instead, the claimant must prove that the statute has not
run).
" Bartlett v. Commonwealth, 418 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Ky. 1967).
" Civ. No. 87383 (Franklin Cir. Ct. 1976).
" KRS § 12.214 (Supp. 1976).
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Section 3 of the Kentucky Constitution. 4 Section 3 provides:
"All men, when they form a social compact, are equal; and no
grants of exclusive, separate public emoluments of privileges
shall be made to any man or set of men, except in consideration
of public services." While state defense of an employee removes
the employee's personal risk of litigation so as not to deter him
from taking public office,95 it has been argued that for the Act
then to require payment of the judgment by the state "goes too
far" in that it creates a special privilege. 6 However, the Court
has held that Section 3 should not be "too strictly interpreted
else public services and public welfare would suffer."97 Al-
though the Board of Claims also provides for compensation to
be paid out "of the general fund of the commonwealth,"9 8 there
appears to be no successful challenge to its constitutionality.9
But it seems clear that the thrust of both the Board of Claims
provisions and the Employe Defense Act is to compensate the
victims of negligent conduct by an employee of the state, not
to create a privilege.
However, the Act may be subject to the more serious chal-
lenge of indefiniteness. Because no clear indication of legisla-
tive intent is available, the question of the Act's application
under the Governor's Regulations will have to be resolved by
the courts. In so doing, the courts must first recognize that the
Act's passage was well within the General Assembly's power
under Section 231 of the Kentucky Constitution. Further, in
.Gnau v. Louisville and Jefferson County,' the Court held that
if the General Assembly intended to withdraw the "existing
common law immunity from suit" enjoyed by local governmen-
tal units (e.g., boards of education, sewer districts), "the lan-
guage of the statute would . .. [have to] be more inclusive
and more explicit"'"' than that of the statutes establishing the
11 Memo for Intervening Defendant, supra note 46.
I /d.
'6 Id. at 9.
'7 Miller v. Robertson, 208 S.W.2d 977, 980 (Ky. 1948), cited in Memo of Amicus
Curiae, supra note 65, at 12.
KRS § 44.100 (1970).
" There are apparently no cases challenging the constitutionality of the Board on
any basis.




Board of Claims. It would seem that the language of the Em-
ploye Defense Act is more inclusive.1 2 As there appears to be a
conflict between the provisions of the Act and those of the
Regulations, the general rule of construing legislation in favor
of constitutionality'0 3 would seem to indicate that the language
of the Act should control.
Because of the present restrictiveness of the Board of
Claims, it could be inferred that the legislature intended to
include all agencies of the state within the purview of the Act.
"The Legislature clearly did not intend to duplicate the Board
of Claims Act and did not merely intend to raise the limits of
the Board of Claims, since that could have been easily accom-
plished by an amendment to the Board of Claims Act." ' 4 Just
as the Board of Claims and the Workmen's Compensation
Board' 5 have been found constitutional, the Employe Defense
Act should withstand constitutional attack.
CONCLUSION
In Sheckles v. McClure,"'0 the Attorney General argued that
the Employe Defense Act should be limited to employees of the
central government' 7 because the cost of defending and paying
judgments for all state employees would be prohibitive." 8 This
concern over the commonwealth pocketbook is perhaps the
major reason for the perpetuation of sovereign immunity in
Kentucky. However, "[i]t is no answer to say that the govern-
ment must see to its fiscal integrity. So must every private
citizen be concerned for his own financial resources."'0 9
The General Assembly failed to abrogate sovereign im-
munity in its previous session, and it is doubtful that the doc-
trine will meet defeat in the next session."10 The legislature
M0 See notes 54-58 supra and accompanying text for an explanation of why the
language of the Act suggests it is more inclusive.
'' See Bloemer v. Turner, 137 S.W.2d 387 (Ky. 1939).
'' Memo of Amicus Curiae, supra note 65, at 8.
'° See Greene v. Caldwell, 185 S.W. 129 (Ky. 1916).
'" Civ. No. 87383 (Franklin Cir. Ct. 1976).
' See note 48 supra for an explanation of the Attorney General's argument as to
the limitations of the Act.
M" Memo for Intervening Defendant, supra note 46, at 5-6.
-' Cullinan v. Jefferson County, 418 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Ky. 1967).
"I Interview with Varellas, supra note 35.
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seems content merely to wear down the state's immunity
through the Board of Claims and the Employe Defense Act,
which provide only limited compensation.' "IT]he legisla-
ture might expect the courts themselves to correct an unjust
rule."'" '2 The permissive language of Section 231 of the Ken-
tucky Constitution does not vest the power of abrogation in the
General Assembly."1 The Court too may provide justice. "The
rule of governmental immunity for torts is an anachronism
without rational basis, and has existed only by the force of
inertia.""' It is time for the Court to act.
Peggy S. Foraker Homer
The Board of Claims provides only $20,000 recovery. KRS § 44.070(5)(1970).
The Employe Defense Act now provides up to $50,000. Id. KRS § 12.214(1)(Supp.
1976).
,' Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Ky. 1964).
,, See notes 8 and 11 supra and accompanying text for a discussion construing
this section of the Constitution.
'" Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 91, 359 P.2d 457, 460 (1961).
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